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III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case is seven years old.

After a number of

delays and superficial rulings, Judge Moffat granted summary
judgment for Memorial Estates.
bother to read the file.

The trouble is that he didn't

The summary judgment was granted on

the broadest possible grounds.
Because of the unusual treatment in the trial court,
Schoney was required to brief all possible theories in this
complex case.

Because of a computer failure, Schoney's final

79-page brief was delayed.

This Court struck the 79-page brief

and received, instead,a 30-page preliminary draft brief.
However, the 30-page brief did not include treatment
of the class issues.

Therefore, by striking the 79-page final

brief, this Court effectively dismissed a putative class.

Such

a dismissal violates due process standards established by the
United States Supreme Court, as well as Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e), which states:

1

A class action may not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the
Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members
of the class in such manner as the Court
directs.
IV.
ARGUMENT
DUE PROCESS CONCERNS HAVE ARISEN IN THIS CASE
A.

Introduction
This will

procedural

not be

history

of

a traditional

this

case

is

reply brief.

so

unusual

The

that

a

traditional brief is not possible.
Specifically,

recent

serious due process issues.

rulings

of

this

Court

raise

Schoney is obligated to advise the

Court of such due process issues at the earliest possible time.
See Sparrow v.

Reynolds, 646

F.

Supp. v (D.C.D.C. 1986); C£.

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975
(1967).
Furthermore, error is often cumulative.

See In Re:

Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (1924) (per Justice Cardozo); Allett v.
Hill,

422

Industries,

So.2d

1047

763 S.W.

(Fla.App.

2d 333

1982);

(Mo.App. 1988).

Wiedower

v.

ACF

Therefore this

reply brief will present the due process issue in the context
of the overall case.
2

B.

Delay
This case was filed on June 14, 1982.

been

set

Schoney

was

responsible for one continuance due to a change in staff.

(R.

510-513-)

The

the

convenience

of

Estates,

and

reset

for

other
the

trial

six

continuances

court

or

the

times!

The case has

were

granted

convenience

of

for

Memorial

Several of the delays were from first place trial

settings.

(See Chronology

Twice Schoney
such delays.

at Brief

of Appellant, p.

sought assignment of a special
(R. 522, 1085.)

8-9.)

judge to avoid

Neither request was granted.

If this case is remanded, it will likely take another
year to get on the trial calendar, and perhaps two years to
process

an appeal

from the trial.

When the Schoneys

first

walked into a lawyer's office seven years ago, little did they
realize that it would take a decade to process their modest
claim.
C.

Class Certification and Motions to Enlarge the Class
Early

in

the

litigation,

the

trial

court

(Fishier) certified the case to proceed as a class action.
186, 202-204.)
3

judge
(R.

The

original

rather narrow theories.

class

certification

(See R. 202-204.)

was

based

upon

Therefore, Schoney

made a motion to enlarge the class to include the additional
theories and additional parties.

(R. 278.)

At about the same

time, Memorial Estates made a motion to decertify the class.
(R. 487.)
Judge Dee ruled first on the decertification motion.
(R. 726, p. 1 & 2.)

Judge Dee granted that motion to decertify

the class. •*• Next, Judge Dee entertained arguments on the
motion to enlarge the class.^

(R. 726, p. 1-3.)

1

The theory of liability was that Memorial Estates
sold space in non-existent mausoleums, and that Memorial
Estates delayed construction for up to ten years. (See R. 2.)
Judge Dee
limited
the potential class to 26 persons.
Apparently only 26 persons signed the same form of contract as
Schoneys.
Even though the contract form changed slightly,
Schoney presented nearly 300 contracts from customers who were
victims of the same course of conduct. (R. 727-991.)
As a part of that same scheme, Memorial Estates
issued deeds in non-existent mausoleums. Schoney identified 68
identical deeds for Mountain View and 147 identical deeds for
Redwood. (R. 628-629.)
z

Since
the class was
then decertified, Schoney
verbally amended the Motion to Enlarge the Class, to be a
Motion to Recertify the Class based upon the new theories of
liability. (See R. 726 at p. 3.)
4

Memorial

Estates argued that the Motion to Enlarge

the Class presented no new theories.
MR- SWOPE:
Your Honor, it's in the
Amended Complaint, the Second Amended
Complaint, which has been before this Court
since June
1983, Count V, Breach of
Contract to Provide Chapel.
It's been
before the Court.
Count VI, Breach of
Trust.
It's been before the Court. Count
VII, Breach of Statutory Trust. It's been
before the Court. Count VIII, Invasion of
Trust Corpus.
Count X, Failure to
Establish a Statutory Trust.
All these
have been before the Court. These are not
new issues. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 726, p. 8.)
The Court agreed with Memorial Estates.
the Motion to Enlarge the Class.
did not go to the merits.

The Court denied

However, the Court's ruling

The Court simply concluded that the

Motion to Enlarge the Class had already been considered:
And the date of my decision (to decertify
the class) being last Tuesday covers all of
the things that have been done so far. . .
So I've
considered all of these new
theories, and I am denying your Motion to
Enlarge the Class for the three theories,
which are not new theories.
They have
already been considered.
They are in
writing in the file. And I'm decertifying
the class. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 726, p. 11-12.)
In

short,

stepped the issue.

Judge

Dee

(second

judge)

simply

side-

It is abundantly clear that the Motion to
5

Decertify the Class presents wholly different issues from the
Motion to Enlarge the Class.
and

R.

487-492.)

followed

the

Rather

misleading

(Compare R. 202-204; R. 280-285;
Judge

Dee

statement

(second
of

judge)

Memorial

simply

Estates'

counsel.3
D.

Repeated Application For Summary Judgment
After

date

waiting

literally

six

years

to

get

(See para. B above) and after the class was

a

trial

dismissed

under unusual circumstances (See C above), the eve of the
trial

finally approached.

By now a third

judge was on the

scene (Moffat).
Memorial Estates filed a motion for summary judgment.
(R. 1363.)

The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

(R. 137 7.)

This appeal followed.

The problem is that this was Memorial Estates' third
try at summary
filed —
R.

judgment.

Twice before Memorial Estates had

and lost summary judgment motions.

1301.)

(R. 700 and

The third Motion for Summary Judgment was in all

material respects exactly the same as the first two motions for
summary judgment.

(Compare R. 472; R. 1200; and R. 1363.)

*
[Mr. Swope for Memorial Estates]
"All these have been before the Court.
theories." (R. 726, p. 8.)
6

These

are not

new

In short, Memorial
paid off and they
theories.

found

Estates' judge shopping

finally

a judge who would agree with their

The problem is that such judge shopping is a square

violation of §78-7-19, Utah Code Ann.
If an application for an order. . . is
refused in whole or in part. . . no
subsequent application for the same order
can be made to any other judge, except of a
higher court.
E.

Failure to Review the Record
Undaunted by the fact that the same motion had been

heard on two prior occasions, (See Para. D above) Judge Moffat
forged ahead.

The problem is that Judge Moffat didn't bother

with the nicety of reading the file.

After two other judges

had managed this complex case for over six years, Judge Moffat
casually mentioned:
We have a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Haven't had a chance to look at
the file. . .
(June 21, 1988 Transcript at p. 2, Lines 4-5.)
Thus Judge Moffat could not follow his duty to,
" . . . carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions..."
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d

1266

(Utah

1976).

Under

lesser

circumstances, federal courts have reversed summary judgments.
Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.

7

1980);

Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722

F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983).
During the course of the summary
numerous fact issues were examined:
interrogatories

were

judgment hearing,

viz. whether defendant's

lost or delayed

in the mail

(June 21,

1988 Tr. p. 5, Lines 18-25); whether Memorial Estates had ever
made a suggestion of death on the Record (June 21 Tr. at p. 11,
Lines 17-20; p. 12, Lines 10-13); whether an offer of judgment
in the sum of $4,000 would satisfy all of Schoney's claims
(June

21

Tr. at p.

shown

a picture

of

14, Lines

7-11);

the mausoleum

whether

before

Schoneys

it was

were

constructed

(June 21 Tr. at p. 15, Lines 2-13); whether the Schoneys were
shown a rendering of a mausoleum at Redwood Road or Mountain
View

(June

21

Tr.

at

p.

16,

Lines

20-25);

whether

the

mausoleums at Mountain View and Redwood Road were substantially
the

same

(June

21 Tr. at p.

17, Lines

11-15); whether

the

construction of a mausoleum at Redwood Road put the Schoneys on
notice that a later mausoleum at Mountain View would be of the
same quality

(June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Lines 6-10);

whether a

chapel has always been available at Mountain View (June 21 Tr.
at p. 18, Line 22 - p. 19, Line 5 ) ; whether it was reasonable
for

Schoneys

to

purchase

an

alternate

mausoleum

space

(at

Sunset Lawn) (June 21 Tr. at p. 27); whether Memorial Estates
8

sold more crypts than had been constructed (June 21 Tr. at p.
31, Lines 1-4); whether the Schoneys purchased a mausoleum at
Redwood Road or Mountain View (June 21 Tr, at p. 36 and 37);
whether

Memorial

Estates

properly

accounted

for

trust

funds

(June 21 Tr. at p. 4 3, Lines 8-22); whether Memorial Estates
held a dead corpse as a hostage (June 21 Tr. at p. 4 6, Lines
1-9); whether Memorial Estates told Schoneys that their money
would be held in trust

(June 21 Tr. at p. 46, Lines

10-19);

whether Memorial Estates represented that a mausoleum would be
built when there were no plans to do so (June 21 Tr. at p. 47,
Lines 1-7); whether it was reasonable for Memorial Estates to
substitute an LDS chapel for the Schoneys, who were a non-LDS
family

(June 21 Tr. at p. 48, Lines 12-22); whether a chapel

was available at both Mountain View and Redwood Road (June 21
Tr.

at

p.

prejudiced^

51,

Lines

because

1-3); whether
Schoney

approximately 15 days late.^

Memorial

answered

Estates

was

interrogatories

(June 21 Tr. at p. 5, Lines 1-

15.)
*
Memorial Estates was guilty
delays much more serious than 15 days.
at p. 7.)

of numerous discovery
(See Brief of Appellant

5
Memorial Estates argued that the case of W.W. & W. B.
Gardner v. Parkwest Valley, 568 P.2d 734 justified dismissal as
a sanction.
(June 21 Tr. at p. 4-5.)
Without reading the
case, Judge Moffat held tiiat the Gardner case "requires"
dismissal. (June 21 Tr. at 51.)
9

In summary, it was clear error for Judge Moffat to
grant summary judgment in such a complicated case, and in face
of numerous fact issues, without even reading the file.
F.

Refusal to Permit Schoneys to File a Complete Brief
After losing in the trial court, Schoneys appealed.

The

legal

theories

were

numerous

and

complex.

At

the

conclusion of oral argument, Judge Moffat stated:
I think Mr. Peck's motions are well taken
in every instance. . .
(June 21 Tr. at p. 51.)
That

simple

statement

covers

a

lot

of

territory.

Such

a

shotgun ruling, " . . . made without a deliberate articulation
of

its

rationale,

including

some

underlying

the

court's

decision

disciplined

and

informed

review

of

appraisal

of

[does

not]

the

Court's

the
allow

for

a

discretion."

Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978).
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.°

factors

Compare

in short, Schoney

was left to brief all possible issues in a very complex case.

b

"The Court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules . . . 56. . . when the motion is based on more than
one ground."
10

Schoney filed a 30 page preliminary draft brief, and
moved

for an additional

brief.

five working days to file the final

The grounds for the motion were that the word

processing

equipment

had broken down.

(Motion and Order to

File Brief with Leave to File Substitute Brief, dated February
10, 1989.)

That motion was denied.

(Order, dated March 7,

1989. ) See Exhibit A.
With one exception, Schoney does not wish to reargue
the substance of that order —

nor would it be proper to do so.

However, one aspect of that order raises due process concerns.
Schoneys
In

connection

with

filed

a 30 page preliminary

that

filing,

Schoney

draft brief.

specifically

noted

that:
Appellant's counsel has prepared a brief
and motion to file with leave to substitute
Exhibits A and B hereto are drafts of both.
The draft of the brief is not the current
one; the current one is in the word
processor memory.
At about 9:00 a.m.
today, February
10, 1989, the office
printer broke down. . .(Emphasis added.)
(Motion
dated

to

File

February

Brief

with

10, 1989.)

Leave

to File Substitute

The motion was

manager of the word processing department.

11

attested

Brief,
by

the

This Court's order of March 7, 1989 did not permit
Schoney to file the version of the brief that was
albeit locked in a broken down computer.

finished—

Rather, this Court's

order stated:
It is further ORDERED that the draft brief
filed on 10 February, 1989 shall comprise
Appellant's Brief.
Appellant shall have
the draft bound and shall file the bound
brief before 10 March, 1989.
(Order, 7 March, 1989.)
In summary, Schoney was

faced with

an awesome task to

summarize six years of litigation in a final appellate brief.
The task was especially difficult because of the superficial
treatment of issues, and shotgun rulings below.
D, E, above.)

(See Para. C,

Schoney had in fact written a complete brief. 7

However, because of an equipment

failure, Schoneys were

not

permitted to file that complete brief.
G.

Dissolution of Class
The

30

page

brief

filed

include a treatment of class issues.

1

on

February

10

did

not

The final 79 page brief,

Schoney believes that the Brief which was locked in
the computer on February 10, 1989 was, in fact, the 79 page
Brief dated 21 February, 1989 (which was rejected by this
Court.)
However, the attorney in charge of the file has been
fired for his mishandling this appeal.
Thus, it may not be
possible to reconstruct exactly what was in the computer on
February 10, 1989.
12

which was rejected by this Court, did include a treatment of
the class issues.
Without regard to fault or error,° the result is that
the putative class has disappeared.

However, that violates

due process rights of the putative class members.
An elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is
to
be
accorded
finality
is
notice
reasonably
calculated, under all the
circumstances,
to apprise
interested
parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306; 70
S.Ct. 652 (1950).
Although Mullane was not a class action, it provides
the due process touchstone for all class actions, see Phillips
Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 012 (1985).
implement

those

due process

considerations, Rule

In order to
23(e) Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure states:

°
This Court apparently views the issue as being
Schoney's fault for trying to make substantive changes after a
brief was filed pursuant to the Court's "Lodging Policy". See
Order, 7 March, 1989.
On the other hand, Schoney views the
issue as clear error.
Schoney contends that the February 10,
1989 filing had nothing to do with the "Lodging Policy". (That
policy has never been promulgated.)
Rather, it was a garden
variety showing of "good cause" for an enlargement of time
pursuant to Rule 22(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
(See Schoneys' Motion for Review, dated 9 March, 19 89.)
13

A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the
Court r
and notice of the dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court
directs. (Emphasis added.)
Due process considerations

require that Rule

23(e)

should apply even where the class has not been certified if
there is any prejudice to absent class members.

Simer v. Rios,

661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981).
In this

case, absent

class members

are

prejudiced

because they might choose to file individual claims if they
were

aware that the class was dissolved*

Furthermore, this

Court has failed to even consider Rule 23(e) in connection with
the dismissal (or dissolution) of the class.^

v.
CONCLUSION
This case has been fraught with delay and superficial
treatment by the trial court.

The cumulative error required

Schoney to write a far reaching brief on every possible aspect

9
it is no solution for the Court to simply blame
Schoney's counsel.
Due process requires that the named
plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of
the class. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985) .
14

of the case,

Schoney accomplished that formidable task in a

reasonable time.

Because of equipment failure the final draft

of the brief was delayed.

This Court struck Schoney's final

brief, and with that ruling the class also fell.
The

totality

of

these

circumstances

has

deprived

putative class members as well as Schoney of their due process
rights.
The only solution is to remand to the trial court for
total reprocessing of the class issues and the summary judgment
issues.

DATED t h i s

<£o

day of

1989

ROBERT J . DEBtar & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for/Appell<
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EXHIBIT A

Page 2

The lodging policy in effect in February 1989, provided
appellant five additional working days to correct technical
defects and to file a substitute brief.

Appellant failed to file

a substitute brief within the five day period.

By correspondence

dated 16 February 1989, the Court notified appellant that the
brief was in default and that the appeal could be dismissed
unless a substitute brief was filed by 24 February 1989.

Appellants substitute brief was filed on 21 February
1989.

The briof^ exclusive of the table of contents, table of

authorities and appendix, is 79 pages in length.

Appellant1s

corrections go to the substance of the brief as well as to
defects which may be addressed under the lodging policy.

Thus,

the substitute brief is improper.

Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that appellant*a
Motion To File Cverlongth Brief is denied.

It is further ORDERED

that the draft brief filed on 10 February 1989 shall comprise
appellants brief.

Appellant shall have the draft bound and

shall file the bound brief, together with seven copies, on or
before 10 March 19ft3. Although the* cverlength brief is not:
accepted, the Appendix To Appellant's Brief, filed 21 February
1989, is accepted.

***** w **"»** %*w««<»

-^m

-—00O00——
George K« Schoney and
Erma J. Schoney, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

ORDER

v,

Case No* 880630-CA

Memorial Estates, inc.,
Defendants and Respondents,

This matter is before the Court upon (a) appellant's
several motions for extensions to file appellant's brief, (b)
appellant's Motion To File Overlength Brief, filed 21 February
1939, (c) respondent's Motion To Dismiss, filed 21 February 1989
and (d) appellant's Motion To Refer Motion To Dismiss, filad 1
March 1989-

On 10 February 1989, appellant filed a 20 page brief, in
draft form, together with a Motion To File Brief With Leave To
File Substitute Biief.

Thereafter, on 21 February 3 989,

appellant filed a Motion To Extend Time For Filing Substitute
Brief and a Motion To File Overlength Brief*

The substitute bri^f was filed pjrsuant to the Court's
internal policy for lodging briefs•

The purpose of the policy is

to permit a party, who makes a good faith effort to timely file a
brief, extra time to correct technical defects in the brief•
Technical defects include improper covers, inadequate binding or
lack of binding, incorrect pagination, and etc.

The lodging

policy does not provide an opportunity to amend the substance of
the arguments contained in the brief.

^^^ fT^^Ny

Page 3

It is also ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss is
denied.

Respondent's brief shall be due thirty days from 10

March 1989. That is, respondent shall file its brief on or before
9 April 1989.

Further/ it is ORDERED that appellant's Motion To

Refer Motion To Dismiss is denied.

Dated this

" 7 ^ * day of March 1989.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Russell W. Bench

